This Study investigates the Relationship between CORPORATE GOVERNANCE and earning quality the listed companies in Tehran stock exchange, over the period of 2002 through 2008. In this study following Gov-SCORE developed by Brown and Caylor (2006), the CORPORATE GOVERNANCE has investigated by using features of dual responsibility of CEO, board of directors independent, board of directors size, board of directors ownership, institutional investors ownership, auditor size, auditor tenure, CEO tenure and law merchant compliance. To determinate of earning quality based on modified Jones (1991) model, used from absolute value of discretionary accruals. For test of hypothesis are used the variance analyse (ANOVA) and multiple linear regression and measurement method of Cross-sectional. We find evidence that there is no significant relationship between all of the features of CORPORATE GOVERNANCE used in this study and earning quality. Also, there is no significant Difference between earning quality of companies with strong, medium and weak CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.

The aim of this study is to evaluate the direct and indirect CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORE and performance. in prior research, The role of information quality intervener in explaining the relationship between CORPORATE GOVERNANCE and performance is not considered. In this regard, the present study seeks to explain the theoretical framework based on the quality of information intervener's variable, and this is a kind of contribution. For this purpose, the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange in the 1390-1394 times for 125 firms, intervals using a combination of generalized method of moment's estimators for dynamic panel models were used to. The relation is a direct correlation between CORPORATE GOVERNANCE and performance in relation to CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, an indirect relationship was established. The results indicate that a change in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE leads to increased rates of 0.19 of the direct effect of the accounting practices of the 0.11 and 0.08, which an indirect effect. This reflects the impact of information quality on the relationship between CORPORATE GOVERNANCE and performance.

Based on majority view in the management of public corporations, minority rights are less relevant and, in some cases, managers abuse their position. In this regard, solutions need to be provided to support minority shareholders. The American model of CORPORATE GOVERNANCE system to protect the rights of minority shareholders includes "fair disclosure of financial information in both seasonal and annual reports, and the need for a disclosure committee to review and monitor reporting to supervisory bodies and the publication of dividends", "the need to get informed of the issues before the meeting and the possibility to submit a proposal to the general assembly by each of the shareholders in accordance with a number of precise procedures", "the necessity of forming a committee of candidates in each company and the possibility of filing a lawsuit" Designed by each of the shareholders against the offenders in the name of the company in the form of a derivative dispute Which is categorized into four categories of "information rights", "management rights", "control rights" and "procedural rights". In Iran's law, although there is no special law on the "CORPORATE GOVERNANCE", but in various laws related to public corporations, such as the "Bill of Amendments to the Part of the Trade Law Act of 1347" And regulations and instructions related to the CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, such as "Annual Reporting of Managers to the General Assembly", "Acquainting Stockholders with the Issues of the Meeting before the Holding", and "The possibility of filing a minimum installment of one fifth of shareholders for managers under a number of conditions". The present study is carried out with a comparative method and the collected data have been analyzed according to the legal provisions of the two legal systems studied. Identifying numerous deficiencies in mandatory legal provisions regarding minority rights in Iranian law, especially in the areas of "financial disclosure and transparency", "voting system" and "derivative action", including the findings and results of the present study. In each section, solutions and suggestions are provided.

Agency relationship, conflict of interests, and asymmetry of information have been examined and discussed in detail in more classic economic systems and CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. In this paper we attempt to apply these concepts to healthcare delivery system to understand its nature and dynamics. Considering the vital role of health insurance, the nature of agency cost in various forms of insurance is examined. Finally, we suggest strategies for handling and containment of this phenomenon in health systems with any forms of insurance.

Objective of This, is to study, examin relationship between CORPORATE GOVERNANCE mechanisms involve: percent of non-executive directors on board, blockholder ownership, institutional ownership and ownership concentration on cost of equity capital.to do This research, we rank firms as to CORPORATE GOVERNANCE mechanisms. TOPSIS method is used to rank sampling consisted of 114 companies listed in Tehran stock exchange during 2005-2011, which were selected by screening. hypotheses tested by multiple regression and generalized least squares method (GLS) was performed. We applied mann-whitney test to present difference between average cost of equity capital firms in high/low rank. the result corroborates that there is a direct relation between The percent of board, block holder ownership, institutional ownership and ownership concentration with cost of equity capital, there is also a Negative and significant relation between the CORPORATE GOVERNANCE high/low rank with cost of equity capital.